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FEA TURE ARTICLES
Whither Dr. Miles?
By Mark D. Bauer*
I. Introduction
Commenting on the French Revolution, Edmund Burke wrote
"it is with infinite caution that any man ought to venture upon pulling
down an edifice which has answered in any tolerable degree for ages
the common purposes of society."' The U.S. Supreme Court recently
failed to heed that admonition, overruling the ninety-six year old
precedent of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Parks & Sons Co. 2 In
the 5-4 decision of Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS,
Inc. 3, the Court replaced Dr. Miles' bright-line holding with
confusion and uncertainty.
In its 1911 Dr. Miles decision, the Court held that it was per
sen illegal for a manufacturer to dictate a product's final price at
* Associate Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law. A.B. The
University of Chicago; J.D. Emory University. Some of the material in this essay
was presented at the 2007 Southeastern Association of Law Schools annual
conference. The author wishes to thank Linda Harrison, Marco Jimenez, and Bill
Page, who appeared on the same discussion panel; Russ Weaver, the executive
director of SEALS; and Joe Morrissey, who provided helpful comments to a draft
of this essay. This essay was supported by a generous research grant from Stetson
University College of Law.
1 EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE

(2d ed.

1790).
2 Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Parks & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
3 Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007).
4 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997). Under the "per se rule,"
inherently anticompetitive restraints on competition, such as price fixing, are
conclusively deemed unlawful without any inquiry into their alleged
reasonableness. Id. at 150. Under the "rule of reason," a court examines and
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retail. 5 Few scholars and practitioners would argue that Dr. Miles
was a perfect decision. Written at the dawn of antitrust regulation, it
relied on theories and concepts that have long since been abandoned
by mainstream antitrust law.6 Yet, until Leegin, the Court's per se
rule against price fixing remained good law. Indeed, the Court has
cited Dr. Miles in dozens of opinions over the years 7 and lower
8
courts, moreover, have cited the decision on hundreds of occasions.
Opinions regarding the significance of Dr. Miles' vary
widely. Some commentators have argued that the entire discount
retail sector (including Wal-Mart and Target) would not exist but for
Dr. Miles and its progeny. 9 In Leegin, however, the Court suggested
its decision essentially to scrap Dr. Miles might have a
procompetitive impact on the economy, while the dissent made a
"safe prediction" that prices at retail will increase.1 1 Which side will
prove to be right is anyone's guess at this point. This essay reviews
these issues and concludes, nevertheless, that the Court acted rashly

balances competitive factors to determine whether a restraint on trade is
"unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions." Id.
' Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 408.
See, e.g., Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 404 (comparing price fixing between a
manufacturer and retailer to general restraints on alienation of property law).
7 See, e.g., State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 11; Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs.
Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724 (1988); 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 341
(1987); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984); Cal.
Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1980);
Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 67-68 (1977); Simpson v.
Union Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13, 28 (1964); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.,
362 U.S. 29, 38 (1960); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S.
384, 386 (1951); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 721
(1944); United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85, 96-100 (1920);
United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 306 (1919).
6

8 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2731 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
9 See, e.g., id. at 2735 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Supreme Court Decision on
Retail Price Setting: Hearing Before the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Competition Policy and Consumer Rights, 110th Cong. (2007) (opening statement
of Sen. Kohl, Chair) [hereinafter Kohl Statement]; Supreme Court Decision on
Retail Price Setting: Hearing Before the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Competition Policy And Consumer Rights, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Marcy
Syms, Chief Executive Officer, Syms Corp.) [hereinafter Syms Statement].
10Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2714-15.

11Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2737.

2007]

Whither Dr. Miles?

in eliminating a very useful precedent in favor of speculative
assumptions.
Part II of this essay looks at the history of this legal issue. It
first reviews the Dr. Miles decision and its close cousin, U.S. v.
Colgate & Co. 12 Colgate limited the impact of Dr. Miles by giving
resolute businesses a circuitous roadmap to circumvent it. This
section will also detail efforts to legislatively nullify Dr. Miles
through the Miller-Tydings Act and Fair Trade legislation, and then
discuss acts of Congress to restore and preserve Dr. Miles by
repealing Miller-Tydings. Part III of this essay discusses the Leegin
decision, its flaws, and Congressional reaction. Part IV suggests
likely outcomes resulting from Leegin.

II. Dr. Miles and the Per Se Rule: Creation,

Circumvention, and Restoration
A. Dr. Miles: The Salesman
WOMAN FINALLY RECOVERS FROM NERVOUS
BREAKDOWN ....
If you are troubled with loss of
appetite, poor digestion, weakness, inability to sleep, if you
are in a general run down condition, and unable to bear
your part of the daily grind of life, you need something to
strengthen your nerves. You may not realize what is the
matter with you, but that is no reason why you should delay
treatment. Dr. Miles' Nervine has proven its value in
nervous disorders for thirty years, and merits a trial, no
3
matter how many other remedies have failed to help you.'
14
In 1882, during an era when patent remedies were popular,
Dr. Franklin Miles of Elkhart, Indiana, invented Nervine, 5a
"calmative compound," and began selling it to druggists for resale.'

12Colgate & Co., 250

U.S. at 307.

13Woman Finally Recovers from Nervous Breakdown, FALLS CITY NEWS
(OR),
Aug.
8,
1914,
available at
http://www.fallscity.org/history/
zunck/fcnews/08081914.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2007).

14The term "patent medicine" was a misnomer because very few of these
remedies were actually patented. Rudolph J.R. Peritz, 'Nervine' and Knavery: The
Life And Times Of Dr. Miles Medical Company, NYLS Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 06/07-21, Social Science Research Network, available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=-959425 (last visited Oct. 17, 2007).
'5 See

Bioanalytical

Systems, Inc.,

Miles

Laboratories,

http://www.bio
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Dr. Miles recommended Nervine for a variety of illnesses, including
nervous exhaustion, headaches and insomnia, epilepsy, and pains,
spasms, and backaches. 16 Unlike many of the snake-oil salesmen of
the time,' 7 Dr. Miles' Nervine included bromides, the precursor to
modem18 tranquilizers, and did have a therapeutic (if mildly toxic)
effect.
Because the costs of market entry were low, and the products
were easy to replicate, new home remedies, such as Dr. Miles',
attracted a host of competitors. 19 While competition20 generally
enhances consumer welfare, it can also lead to free riding.
Although there are many variations on free riding, the theory
is that one producer or retailer will invest in product development,
analytical.com/ info/calendar/99/06miles.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2007); See also
Time.com, For That Great Feeling, April 23, 1965, http://www.time.com/
time/printout/0,8816,833668,00.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2007); Indiana Historical
Society, Bayer Corporation, http://www.indianahistory.org/HBR/businesspdf/
BAYER.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2007).
16 Indiana Historical Society, supra note 15.
These products primarily boasted of the therapeutic value of a secret
ingredient, which was often alcohol. Peritz, supra note 14, at 2. Some of these
products had genuine therapeutic value and continue to be sold today. See, e.g,.
Press Release, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Charges Marketers of Doan's Pills
with Making Deceptive Back-Pain Relief Claims (June 26, 1996)
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1996/06/doans.shtm. Some, such as Dr. Miles' Compound
Extract of Tomato, found their way into America's kitchens. Peritz, supra note 13,
at 2 (the ingredients for this Dr. Miles compound were likely taken from bottles of
Heinz Ketchup). See also JAMES YOUNG, THE TOADSTOOL MILLIONAIRES 165-66
(1961); DAVID ARMSTRONG & ELIZABETH ARMSTRONG, THE GREAT AMERICAN
MEDICINE SHOW 167 (1991). And others, like Coca-Cola, had their more
controversial ingredients removed at some point. Peritz, supra note 14, at 2-3;
ARMSTRONG & ARMSTRONG, supra, at 161 (Coca-Cola was originally made with
coca leaves, and included at least some amount of cocaine).
18 Indiana Historical Society, supra note 15; James W. Jefferson, Old Versus
17

New Medications: How Much Should Be Taught?, 29:2 ACAD. PSYCHIATRY 162
(2005). Although bromides were commonly used in psychiatric hospitals during
the Nineteenth Century, they were later discarded because of toxicity. Id. at 163.
19 Peritz, supra note 14. The problem was somewhat ameliorated by the
Trademark Act of 1905 and the Pure Food & Drug Act of 1906; the Trademark Act
protected against dilution, and the Pure Food & Drug Act eliminated the more
dangerous concoctions. See Peritz, supranote 14; Trademark Act, ch. 592, § 5, 33
Stat. 724 (1905); Pure Food & Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768-70
(1906) (repealed 1938).
20 See generally Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair
Trade?, 3 J. L. & ECON. 86 (1960).
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new technology, customer service, or the creation of the proper
ambience for purchasing the product. After initial investment, other
producers or retailers benefit from the growing demand and
consumer recognition. These followers generally sell their product at
a discount, "free riding" off of the work of the first producer. 2' In
addition to its inherent unfairness, free riding may make firms
reluctant to invest in research, customer service, or advertising if a
competitor can subsequently offer a similar product at a lower
price. 22

B. Dr. Miles: The Case
Free riding set the stage for a showdown between Dr. Miles
and discounter John D. Park & Sons. 23 While Dr. Miles attempted to
maintain premium prices for Nervine and other remedies, and to
differentiate its brand from competitors, Park & Sons sought to
expand its discount drug business and draw traffic to its stores by
taking advantage of Dr. Miles' advertising. 24 Finally, Dr. Miles
required all retailers to agree to resell its products at a predetermined
price. 2 5 Dr. Miles' sales contract purported to make the wholesaler a
consigner, although the contract had many features inconsistent with
the creation of an agency or consignment.

21

For a detailed explanation of free riding, see

FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY

456-60 (3d ed. Thompson/West, 2005);

RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW
22

STEPHEN

F.

HERBERT HOVENKAMP,

See also

172-173 (2d ed. Univ. of Chicago, 2001).

Ross, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW

225-26 (Foundation

Press 1993).
23 Miles prevailed in two earlier suits that upheld resale price maintenance: See
Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. Platt, 142 F. 606, 610-11 (N.D. Ill. 1906) (determining
intellectual property rights are outside rules against restraints of trade) and Miles
Med. Co. v. Goldthwaite, 133 F. 794, 795 (C.C.D. Mass. 1904) (determining that
resale price maintenance was a lawful property right of intellectual property
monopolists); World's Dispensary Medical Ass'n v. Same, Hartman v. Same, 142
F. 606 (N.D. I11.1906) (holding that intellectual property rights are outside rules
against restraints of trade).
24 See Peritz, supra note 14; Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 374.
25

Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 374-75.

Dr. Miles, 164 F. 803, 804-05 (6th Cir. 1908). The formalism of
consignment over sale continued to be an issue for the Supreme Court through
United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 490 (1926) (determining agents were
not purchasers and title passed from manufacturer to consumer), and Simpson v.
Union Oil, 377 U.S. 13, 22-23 (1964) (limiting General Electric holding to patented
26
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Thirteen years earlier, the Court decided United States. v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., which rendered per se unlawful any
direct restraint on trade without any inquiry into its reasonableness.
Applying the Addyston Pipe standard, the Court found that Dr. Miles'2 8
retailers was subterfuge
attempt to consign drugs to wholesalers and
• •
•
29
and its true intent was to fix prices with wholesalers and retailers.
Although criticized for equating (and confusing) horizontal cartel
activity with vertical price fixing,30 Dr. Miles instituted an iron-clad
against minimum vertical resale price maintenance
per se rule
31
(,RPM").

C. The Colgate Doctrine Exception
Eight years after the Dr. Miles decision, the Court's holding
32
in Colgate created a loophole in the law of vertical price restraints.
In Colgate, the Court held that imposing RPM was lawful,
provided that the seller did so unilaterally. 33 While a manufacturer
may not enter into an agreement with a reseller on price, the Court
stated, "he may announce in advance the circumstances under which
he will refuse to sell."34 The result, called the "Colgate Doctrine,"
products).
21 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 175 U.S. 211, 237-38 (1899).
Dr. Miles also argued that its property
28 Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 397-400.
rights in its trade secrets allowed it to dictate prices to resellers. Id.at 382-83. The
Supreme Court responded that whatever right there might be, a restraint on
alienation is invalid. Id. at 404.
29
Id.at 408.
30

See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 33 (Free Press 1978);

Ross, supra note 22, at 225-26.
31 Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 408. See also FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257
U.S. 441 (1922); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707
(1944). The term "RPM" will be used throughout this essay to describe minimum
resale price maintenance; other forms, including maximum resale price
maintenance, will be described separately.
32 Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). Interestingly, the opinion in Dr. Miles
was written by then-Associate Justice Charles Evans Hughes. Hughes resigned
from the Supreme Court to run, unsuccessfully, for the Republican candidate for
president in 1916, and then successfully represented Colgate as a private attorney.
33 Id. at 307. Colgate had engaged in a number of practices intended to
influence the resale price of its products. Id. at 303. See also Russell Stover
Candies, Inc. v. FTC, 718 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1983) (upholding Colgate Doctrine).
34 Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. at 307.
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meant that producers wishing to engage in RPM were required to

announce the required retail price before an order was placed, and
then terminate-without any discussion-any reseller that deviated.3 5

Not every producer desired to reign in its sales force and risk
potentially contentious relationships with customers by exercising the

Colgate Doctrine, but Colgate36did provide a roadmap for firms

dedicated to implementing RPM.
The distinction between Dr. Miles and Colgate may be very

technical-and even an artificial legal fiction unrelated to economic
analysis 37-but
it remained the law until Leegin. Countless
enterprises used these two cases as templates for business models.3 8
D. Legislative Reaction to Dr. Miles
The Great Depression created new challenges for antitrust
laws. Small family businesses had trouble surviving, and the antitrust
laws seemed to support big business at the expense of small
business. 39 Chain stores such as A&P, Woolworth's, and J.C. Penney
entered small towns and were accused of unethical business practices,
including selling loss leaders, buying at discounts unavailable to
smaller stores, and sucking money out of local communities into
distant big cities. 4 °

35 See Peritz, supra note 14, at 5-6.
36 Manufacturers may be loath to cut off non-complying retailers, their only

choice under Colgate; furthermore, manufacturers might face additional claims
under state dealer-protection laws in addition to antitrust risks. Supreme Court
Decision on Retail Price Setting: Hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on
Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights,
0 th Cong. (2007) (written
testimony of Richard M. Brunell, American Antitrust Institute) [Hereinafter Brunell
Statement].
37 ANDREW GAVIL, WILLIAM KOVACIC & JONATHAN BAKER, ANTITRUST LAW
IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 363

(West 2002).
38 In fact, the Supreme Court refused at least one previous invitation by the
U.S. Department of Justice to overrule Dr. Miles. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 761 n.7;
See also Parke,Davis & Co., 362 U.S. at 29.
39 Richard C. Schragger, The Anti-Chain Store Movement, Localist Ideology,
and the Remnants of the Progressive Constitution, 1920-1940, 90 IOWA L. REV.
1011 (2005).
40 Id. at 1013, 1019-25, 1058-59. Many of these same arguments are made
against Wal-Mart today. Id. at 1089.
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One response of Congress was to pass the Miller-Tydings Act
in 1937.41 Miller-Tydings allowed states to enact so-called "Fair
RPM in
Trade" laws, which circumvented Dr. Miles by permitting
42
individual states if the state passed an enabling act.
RPM was popular with small retailers during the deflation of
the Great Depression, because it set a baseline price for retail that
could not be undersold.43 Without RPM, businesses argued "ruinous
competition" would ensue, resulting in public harm.4
Small
businesses in particular argued that they were entitled to receive a
"fair price" or a "just profit." It was even suggested-perhaps
inexplicably by today's standards for economic analysis-that with
RPM consumers would no longer be "gypped by the predatory cutrater.., and suckered by loss leaders.' ' Not surprisingly, with the
Great Depression creating pressure to do almost anything to help the
economy by the late 1930s the majority of states had legislatively
overruled
Dr. Miles and legalized RPM by enacting state Fair Trade
46
laws.

41 Miller-Tydings

Act, ch. 690, tit. 8, 50 Stat. 673, 693 (1937). The
constitutionality of Miller-Tydings was established one year earlier in Old
Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 193 (1936) (states
have power to delegate to individuals the power to fix prices for their own
property). The same year Congress passed Miller-Tydings, Congress also passed
the Robinson-Patman Act, which inter alia prohibited discriminatory discounts to
large buyers under certain circumstances. Pub. L. No. 74-692, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 13-13b, 21a (2007).
42 See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 390-394
(1951). After Schwegmann, Congress passed the McGuire Act which overruled the
case and it made it abundantly clear that Congress permitted the states to enact Fair
Trade laws. 66 Stat. 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C.A §45 (Supp. 1953).
43 Schragger, supra note 39, at 1064.
44 Id. at 1065.
The Fair Trade movement asserted that price fixing would
prevent ruinous competition, and that some cartels or monopolies "could rationalize
business and prevent injuries to producers and consumers." Schragger, supra, at
1065-66. Neither the Sherman Act nor federal antitrust jurisprudence (and
certainly not the Chicago School) recognize that competition can ever be ruinous.
45 Id. at 1066. While consumers today rarely complain about paying too low
a
price, there are related arguments that inexpensive items, particularly sold at
discount stores such as Wal-Mart, hurt American prosperity by exporting jobs (and
capital) to lower cost foreign producers.
46 Id. at 1065. There is some debate as to the exact number of states because
some passed Fair Trade laws and then repealed them; others passed Fair Trade laws
but failed to enforce them. See H.R. REP. No. 382 at 3 (1937); 120 CONG. REC.
37,770 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Edward W. Brooke); See also Rudolph J. Peritz,
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9

By legalizing RPM in certain states, the United States
embarked on a great economic experiment, but one with few controls
or mechanisms to determine its success, failure, or consequences.
Few scholars have performed empirical research on RPM even
today.47 Some believe, however, that one consequence of Dr. Miles'
per se rule against RPM has been the rise of discount stores like WalMart and Target. These experts also believe that the repeal of MillerTydings 48 in 1975 by the Consumer Goods Pricing Act ("CGPA"),
which outlawed state Fair Trade laws and restored Dr. Miles as the
law of the land,49 made possible the enormous expansion of discount
stores in the U.S. economy.
Another consequence of Fair Trade and RPM may be
businesses such as Costco and Sam's Club. As with many distortions
to the economy, the Fair Trade laws had an effect that probably few
anticipated; in the case of Fair Trade, it led to the creation of
membership stores. 50
Miller-Tydings provided an exemption
Frontiers Of Legal Thought I: A Counter-History Of Antitrust Law, 1990 DUKE L.
J. 263, 298 (1990); Terry Calvani & Andrew G. Berg, Resale Price Maintenance
After Monsanto: A Doctrine Still At War With Itself, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1163, 1175

(1984).
47 See, e.g., Richard Posner, ANTITRUST LAW 151 (1976); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Antitrust Law Enforcement in the Vertical Restraints Area: Vertical
Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 151 (1984); Pauline
M. Ippolito, Resale Price Maintenance:Empirical Evidence from Litigation, 34 J.
L. & ECON. 263, 293 (1991); THOMAS R. OVERSTREET, RESALE PRICE
MAINTENANCE: ECONOMIC THEORIES AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 1 (1983).

Brief for Consumer Federation of America as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 8-9, Leegin, 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007) (No. 06-480); S. Robson Walton,
Antitrust, RPM, and the Big Brands: Discounting in Small Town America, 14
ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 81, 81-83 (1982); RICHARD VEDDER & WENDELL
48

Cox, THE WAL-MART REVOLUTION: How BIG Box STORES BENEFIT CONSUMERS,
WORKERS, AND THE ECONOMY 179 (American Enterprise Institute 2006); See also

Kohl Statement supra note 9 (stating Kohl's Department Store was only able to
grow because of the per se rule against RPM, and this may stop "the next Sam
Walton"); See also S. Robson Walton, Antitrust, RPM, and The Big Brands:
DiscountingIn Small-Town America, 14 ANTITRUST L & ECON. REV. 81, 85-86 No.
3 (1982) (stating that the General Counsel of Wal-Mart stated that if RPM were
permitted, Wal-Mart would likely be forced to carry secondary brands and more
imports as a way to avoid it). Some economists have credited Wal-Mart, because
of its enormous sales and low prices, as having held down inflation for the entire
country. Steven Greenhouse, Wal-Mart a Nation Unto Itself, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17,

2004, at 7.
49 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2724-25.
50 Popular membership stores today include Costco, Sam's Club and B.J.'s
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whereby stores that were open only to members could in fact sell at a
discount to the manufacturer's suggested list price. 5' The first of
such stores, E.J. Korvette's, opened in New York City in 1948; its
founder gave out free membership cards to anyone who asked. 52

III. The Leegin Decision
A. The Case and Decision
Kay and Phil Smith own "Kay's Kloset," a boutique in
suburban Dallas selling women's handbags, belts, and accessories.53
Kay's Kloset has been in business for eighteen years and Leegin
manufactures one of its more popular product lines, the "Brighton"
brand of women's handbags, wallets, watches, jewelry, and
accessories. 54 From 2000 to 2003, Kay's Kloset made approximately
$1.5 million in retail sales of Brighton goods, and was the key
Brighton seller in the area. 55
In 1997, Leegin instituted a policy banning sales to retailers
selling below Leegin's suggested prices. 6 According to the Court,
Wholesale Club. It is yet unknown what effect a return to RPM may have on their
operations.
51See Ch. 690, tit. 8, 50 Stat. 673, 693 (1937).
115 (2003); "I, myself, paid $1.00 to become
a member of a discount house so that they could try to go through the sham that it
wasn't really an ordinary retail operation." Remarks of Rep. John F. Seiberling,
Congress Makes Laws; The Executive Should Enforce Them, 32nd Annual
[Antitrust] Spring Meeting, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 175 (1984).
53 The business is incorporated as PSKS,
Inc.
52

LAURA ROWLEY, ON TARGET

54 Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2711. Leegin sells its Brighton line through thousands
of independent retailers, as well as through stores directly owned or controlled by
Leegin.
55Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint at 7, PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative
Leather Prod., Inc., 2003 WL 24080760 (E.D. Tex.); Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2711.
56 Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2711. The policy contained an exception for products
not selling well. Leegin wrote to its retailers: "[i]n this age of mega stores like
Macy's, Bloomingdales, May Co. and others, consumers are perplexed by promises
of product quality and support of product which we believe is lacking in these large
stores. Consumers are further confused by the ever popular sale, sale, sale, etc....
We, at Leegin, choose to break away from the pack by selling [at] specialty stores;
specialty stores that can offer the customer great quality merchandise, superb
service, and support the Brighton product 365 days a year on a consistent basis ....
We realize that half the equation is Leegin producing great Brighton product and
the other half is you, our retailer, creating great looking stores selling our products

Whither Dr. Miles?
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Leegin adopted this policy to provide retailers with sufficient margins
discounting that
to provide appropriate customer service, and to avoid
57
"harmed Brighton's brand image and reputation."
In December 2002, Leegin learned that Kay's Kloset had
marked down the Brighton line by twenty percent. Kay's Kloset told
Leegin that it had done so in order to compete with nearby retailers
also discounting the Brighton line.5 8 Leegin requested that Kay's
Kloset cease discounting.5 9 When it refused, Leegin stopped selling
its products to Kay's Kloset.
Leegin was responsible for forty to
so the loss of the Brighton line
fifty percent of Kay's
Kloset's
profits,
61
was significant.
At trial and on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, Leegin asked to introduce expert testimony detailing the
procompetitive effects of its pricing policy,

62

ordinarily forbidden

under the per se rule. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine whether vertical minimum resale price maintenance
agreements should remain per se illegal under Dr. Miles. In addition
to briefs from63the parties, the Court accepted amicus briefs from
eleven groups.
in a quality manner." Id. Leegin fails to mention, however, that it sells its products
at Nordstrom. See infra note 151; Leegin, Brighton, Press Release, Feb. 10, 2005,
http://www.brighton.com/retail/privacy/pressreleasel.htm (last visited Oct. 4,
2007).
57 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2711.
58 Id. Previously, Leegin had introduced a premium retail program called
"Heart Stores." Id. Kay's Kloset was expelled from the Heart Store program after
a Leegin employee visited the store and found it "unattractive." Id.
59 Id. Arguably, at this point Leegin violated both Dr. Miles and Colgate by
attempting to enter into an agreement to fix prices with a reseller. Under the
Colgate Doctrine, the pricing policy must be stated in advance by the manufacturer,
and retailers deviating from the policy must be terminated without discussion or
agreement.
60
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2711.
61

Id. at 2711-12.

62

Id. at 2712. See PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc., 2004

WL 5254322 (E.D.Tex. Aug. 17, 2004), aff'd, 171 Fed.Appx. 464 (5th Cir. 2006).
Attorneys General, antitrust chiefs, or other state
63 The briefs were from:
officials from thirty seven states, Anderson Economic Group, Consumer Federation
of America, Burlington Coat Factory, American Antitrust Institute (all in support of
maintaining the per se rule); and American Petroleum Institute, Wireless
Association, the United States (written by the U.S. Department of Justice and
FTC), PING, and a group of economists (all against the per se rule). An addition
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In June 2007, in a decision written by Justice Kennedy, the
Court overruled Dr. Miles, subjecting future RPM cases to the Rule
64
of
Reason.
other
justices.65Justice Breyer wrote a spirited dissent signed by three
B. Key Arguments
Books, articles, empirical studies, and newspaper opinion
pieces likely will be written on Leegin and its aftermath. This section
endeavors to summarize and question the Court's key holdings in the
case.
1. Anticompetitive Effects Will Result in Increased Prices
for Consumers
In overruling Dr. Miles, Justice Kennedy stated that a per se
rule was appropriate when the conduct "always66 or almost always
tends to restrict competition and decrease output."
The phrase "always or almost always," however, places
inappropriate and unprecedented emphasis on how often the
challenged conduct likely is to occur, rather than also focusing on the
enormity of the damage.6 7 In justifying a per se rule against RPM,
Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp wrote:
brief was authored by Professors Comanor and Scherer, two experts on RPM who
purported to support neither side. While the Court may have received additional
correspondence from interested individuals, one that was made public was a letter
from FTC Commission Pamela Jones Harbour to the Court, indicating the reasons
for her disagreement with the FTC's decision to support eliminating the per se rule.
See Federal Trade Commission, An Open Letter to the Supreme Court of the United
States from Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour, Feb. 26, 2007,
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/harbour/070226verticalminimumpricefixing.pdf
(last
visited Oct. 3, 2007).
64 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2712, 2725. The five in the majority were Justices
Kennedy, Roberts, Scalia, Thomas and Alito. The majority, however, left it to the
lower courts to figure out exactly how to apply the Rule of Reason. See id at 2737
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
65 Id. at 2725 (Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined Justice Breyer).
66

Id. at 2717 (quoting Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717,

723 (1988)).
67 Another problem with the statement is that it is not a standard that has been
used consistently to provide a rationale for a per se rule in antitrust. See, e.g.,
Cont'l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50, n.16 (1977) ("Per se rules
thus require the Court to make broad generalizations about the social utility of
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It is thus not enough to suggest that [RPM] is sometimes or

even often beneficial or harmful. The critical questions are
always ones of frequency and magnitude relative to the
business and legal alternatives. Thus ...we must still ask

whether... gains [from RPM] are large enough to
overcome the detriments that consumers may suffer as a
,68
result.
Echoing Areeda and Hovenkamp, the Court held in another
case that "[pier se rules thus require the Court to make broad
generalizations about the social utility of particular commercial
practices. The probability that anticompetitive consequences will
result from a practice and the severity of those consequences
must be
' 69
balanced against its procompetitive consequences."
There has been very little disagreement that overruling Dr.
Miles will lead to at least some increase in prices. 70 "When minimum
retail prices are set, the consumer will pay a higher price for the
brand subject to the price restraint, raising the specter of misallocated
resources or wealth transfers injurious to consumers."71 The Court
should have analyzed the magnitude of these price increases and

particular commercial practices. The probability that anticompetitive consequences
will result from a practice and the severity of those consequences must be balanced
against its pro-competitive consequences. Cases that do not fit the generalization
may arise, but a per se rule reflects the judgment that such cases are not sufficiently
common or important to justify the time and expense necessary to identify them.")
(citing Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); United States v.
Topco Assocs, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609-610 (1972)).
68

PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW

292 (Aspen

Law & Business ed., 2d ed. 2004) (emphasis added). See also Brunell Statement,
supra note 36. Arguably, the existing Colgate doctrine offered a legal alternative
to an RPM agreement.
69 Cont 'lT.V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 50, n. 16 (emphasis added).
70

AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 68, at 292 (suggesting RPM "Tends to

produce higher consumer prices than would otherwise be the case. The evidence is
persuasive on this point."); Overstreet, supra note 47. Justice Kennedy even
acknowledged "'price surveys indicate that [resale price maintenance] in most
cases increased the prices of products sold.' Respondent is mistaken in relying on
pricing effects absent a further showing of anticompetitive conduct." Leegin, 127
S. Ct. at 2718 (quoting Overstreet supra at 160). Of course some who are not
strict adherents to the Chicago School may believe that a non-transitory increase in
prices is anticompetitive on its face.
71LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST:

AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 373 (Thomson/West 2d ed., 2006).
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determined whether their size provided continued justification for a
per se approach to RPM.
In other contexts, the Court already has suggested or implied
that price increases always or almost always restrict competition and
decrease output. For example, RPM prohibits price cutting, and
"cutting prices in order to increase business often is the very essence
of competition., 72 "Price," according to the Court, is the "central
nervous system of the economy., 73 Absent predation, "low prices
benefit consumers regardless of how those prices are set, and ...do
not threaten competition., 74 Justice Kennedy's emphasis on the
frequency of anticompetitive effects overshadowed discussion of the
magnitude of the anticompetitive harm from price increases, and a
corresponding loss in allocative efficiency and consumer welfare.75
The Leegin majority, dismissing cause for concern, suggested
that higher prices for consumers were irrelevant unless
anticompetitive conduct was also demonstrated.76 During oral
arguments, Justice Scalia seemed particularly unimpressed by
arguments that consumers might pay more for goods without the
protections of Dr. Miles:
JUSTICE SCALIA: ....Is it the object of the-is the sole

object of the Sherman Act to produce low prices?
MR. OLSON: 7 7 No.

72

State Oil, 522 U.S. 3 at 15 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 75 U.S. 574, 594 (1986)).
73Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978)
(quoting United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 226 (1940)).
74 Weyerhaseuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 127 S. Ct.
1069, 1075 (2007) (quoting At. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S.
328, 340 (1990)).
75 Allocative efficiency is the most efficient distribution of society's limited
resources, avoiding unnecessary transfers to those with market power, and thus
maximizing consumer welfare. See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 71, at 12.
76 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2718.
Justice Kennedy also suggested that future
courts considering RPM under the Rule of Reason would also have to consider
whether the alleged conduct was committed by a firm with market power. Id. at
2709.
77 Transcript of Oral Argument of Theodore B. Olson on Behalf of the
Petitioner at 13, Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705 (No. 06480), 2007 WL 967030.
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JUSTICE SCALIA: I thought it was consumer welfare.
MR. OLSON: Yes, yes, it is.
JUSTICE SCALIA: And I thought some consumers would
prefer more service at a higher price.
MR. OLSON: Precisely.
JUSTICE SCALIA: So the mere fact that it would increase
prices doesn't prove anything. It doesn't prove that it's
serving consumer welfare. If, in fact, it's giving the
consumer a choice of more service at a somewhat higher
price, that would enhance consumer welfare, so long as
there are competitive products at a lower price, wouldn't it?
MR. OLSON: That's-that's absolutely correct.
JUSTICE SCALIA: So I don't know why, why we should
have to focus our entire attention on whether it's going togoing to produce higher prices or not ....78

Justice Scalia seemed to be echoing an argument made many
years earlier by Robert Bork.79 Bork posited that RPM and vertical
price fixing causes output to expand and the higher margins promote
enhanced consumer welfare and efficiency. To support his position,
Professor Bork viewed the manufacturer's product as a composite of
the product itself, combined with the d6cor and ambience of the retail
establishment where it eventually was sold.8 '
78 Id. at 15.

79 Whether Judge Bork was currently in favor of overruling Dr. Miles is
unknown. In 2002 he wrote to the Antitrust Modernization Commission that the
"antitrust laws are performing well, in fact better than at any time in the past
seventy-five years .... there is very little need for 'modernization."'

Robert H.

Bork, Memorandum to the Antitrust Modernization Commission on Comments on
the Status of the Antitrust Laws, available at http://www.amc.gov/
comments/bork.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2007). Judge Bork did state that he hoped
Robinson-Patman would be repealed, but he did not mention Dr. Miles, RPM or the
per se rule. Id.
80 Br. of William S. Comanor & F.M. Scherer as Amici Curiae Supporting
Neither Party at 4, Leegin, 127 S.Ct. 2705 (No. 06-480) (citing BORK, supra note
30, at 290).
81See BORK, supra note 30, at 296. "[T]hat consumers are better off because
their psychic utility has been enhanced by the amount of the premium.... [] is the

16
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This theory, however, is not universally accepted. Not all
consumers want ambience and not all retailers offer it.8 2 Many
consumers seek, and many retail outlets offer, low price and low
price alone. RPM promotes inefficiency by requiring all storesbeautiful or dismal-to charge the same RPM-mandated nondiscounted price. 83 This potentially is a net transfer from consumers
to some retailers and does not advance consumer welfare.84
When ordered by a manufacturer, there is a possibility RPM
may deter free riding. But when RPM is instituted by individual
power buyers--or a cartel-it prompts a race to the bottom where
consumers pay more and get less. 85 Indeed, the trend towards larger
and more powerful retail outletss 6 may prompt these retailers to
kind of silly reasoning that gives economists a bad name among people of common
sense." Charles E. Mueller et al., Foreword.: Antitrust and the Discounters' Case
against Resale Price Maintenance, 14 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 1, 8. No.3
(1982).
82 According to one retailer, "Maybe the best service I can give you is to sell
you something you couldn't have afforded otherwise." Leonard S. Mattioli, Resale
Price Fixing and The 'Hi-Tech' Discounter: Consumer Electronicsin Madison, 14
ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REv. 11, 17. No.3 (1982). The strongest procompetitive
argument made by the Court may have been that the limited empirical evidence on
RPM "does not suggest efficient uses of [RPM] are infrequent or hypothetical."
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2717.
83 Leegin suggested that when consumers pay more for a product, they feel
better about it. Br. of William S. Comanor & F.M. Scherer, supra note 80, at 3. Just
as this can promote competition to offer the best customer service in order to attract
customers when there is no price competition, it can also lead to a race to the
bottom where all retailers end up offering inadequate service.
84 But see Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2718 ("The Court, moreover, has evaluated
other vertical restraints under the rule of reason even though prices can be
increased in the course of promoting procompetitive effects.").
8'The trend toward larger and more powerful retail outlets may prompt these
retailers to demand RPM from manufacturers rather than the other way around.
The increased concentration in retailing "may enable (and motivate) more retailers,
accounting for a greater percentage of total retails sales volume, to seek resale price
maintenance, thereby making it more difficult for price-cutting competitors
(perhaps intemet retailers) to obtain market share." Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2733
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
86 See, e.g., AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 68, at 48-49; William S.
Comanor, The Two Economics of Vertical Restraints, 21 Sw. U. L. REv. 1265,
1276-81 (1992); Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. F.T.C., 221 F.3d 928, 930 (7th Cir. 2000);
Kris Hudson, States Target Big-Box Stores, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2007, at A8;
Deloitte, 2007 Global Powers of Retailing at 2-G8, available at
http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/article/0,1002,cid%253D135347,00.html (last visited
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demand RPM from manufacturers, rather than the other way around.
With RPM as a shield for these stores, they can cut service and
neglect ambience, but charge the same high price to increase profit
margins.
Denying retailers the ability to sell goods "because they are
aggressive in pricing (and perhaps more efficient as well) hardly
seems to be a service to consumers, or a vote of confidence in the
competitive process." 7 Indeed, quoting from a Consumers Union
editorial during the debate to repeal Miller-Tydings, Senator Brooke
(R) of Massachusetts said "[t]he crux of the problem of resale price
maintenance, is whether the consumer should reap the benefits of the
most efficient forms of retailing or ... should be forced to pay more
88
in order to make retailing. . . a more comfortable occupation."
Furthermore, the Colgate Doctrine already provided a producer
concerned with prestige the ability to safeguard the
89 image of its
products by refusing to do business with discounters.
In addition, still focusing on the frequency rather than the
magnitude of harm, Justice Kennedy noted that during the MillerTydings era "no more than a tiny fraction of manufacturers ever
employed" RPM. 90 Specifically, "no more than one percent of
manufacturers, accounting for no more than ten percent of consumer
goods purchases, ever employed [resale price maintenance] in any
single year in the [US]." '
Even if that is true, the cost to the
American economy in 2007 will be $300 billion, "or an average of
92
roughly $750 to $1,000 annually for an American family of four."
The Court did not explain how such a departure from allocative
efficiency-transferring $300 billion annually from
consumers to
93
manufacturers-could improve consumer welfare.

Oct. 2, 2007).
87

Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Casefor a Per Se

Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1493 (1983).
88 121 CONG. REc. 38,050 (daily ed. Dec. 2, 1975) (statement of Sen. Brooke).
89

See, e.g., Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 761 (citing Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. at

307). At least one discounter has suggested that RPM prevents discounters from
becoming more powerful and popular in the eyes of the public than the

manufacturer. Mattioli, supra note 82, at 21.
90 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2725 (citing T. Overstreet, supra note 47, at 6).
91Leegin, 127
92

S. Ct. at 2725.

Id. at 2735-36 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

93 The majority never mentioned or discussed whether Dr. Miles should be
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During the Miller-Tydings era, Fair Trade laws failed to
increase consumer welfare. 4 When Congress repealed MillerTydings in 1975, 95 it noted evidence that many consumer goods sold
at prices as much as twenty seven percent higher in states which had
enacted Fair Trade laws. 96 In states that had repealed Fair Trade
laws, prices declined as much as forty percent. 97 Numerous studies
reviewed by Congress at the time estimated that RPM cost
Americans
98
from $3 billion to $6.5 billion annually, in 1975 dollars.
overruled because it hurt consumer welfare. See Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2705-26.
94 "The retailers lobbying for [Miller-Tydings and Fair Trade laws] did
not
argue that increased prices and profits would promote consumer welfare by, for
example, making manufacturers' distribution networks more efficient. Instead,
they argued that vigorous competition - and falling consumer prices - were
generally bad for the economy and small businesses." Br. for Thirty Seven States
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 7, Leegin, 127 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 06-480)
(citing Thomas K. McCraw, Competition and Fair Trade: History and Theory, 16
RES. ECON. HIST. 185, 208-09 (1996)). It goes without saying that the Fair Trade
laws did nothing to help the average consumer.
95 Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801
(amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 45(a)); see S. REP. No. 94-466, (1975), as reprintedin
1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1569 (Leg. Hist.).
96 EARL W. KINTNER, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTIRUST

958 (Chelsea House Publishers 1982)
(1975); Quality Stabilization: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on
Commerce, 88th Cong. 6 (1963) (statement of Lee Loevinger, Asst. Att'y Gen.,
Antitrust Div., Dept. of Justice) cited in Brief for Thirty Seven States, supra note
94, at 8; See also Act to Repeal Enabling Legislation for Fair Trade Laws, S. REP.
No. 94-466, at 3 (1975) (repealing the Miller-Tydings Resale Price Maintenance
Act, Pub. L. 314, ch. 690, 50 Stat. 693, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and the McGuire-Keogh Fair
Trade Enabling Act, Pub. L. 543, ch. 745, 66 Stat. 631, 15 U.S.C. § 45); See
generally McCraw, supra note 94.
97 KINTNER, supra note 96, at 978.
When Levi Strauss stopped requiring
minimum RPM on its men's blue jeans, retail prices plummeted, saving consumers
$200 million in eighteen months. William S. Comanor, F.M. Scherer & Robert L.
Steiner, Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of Inference: The Response of the
American Antitrust Institute 8 (AAI Working Paper No. 05-04, 2005), available at
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/archives/files/408.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2007).
98 KINTNER, supra note 96, at 958; F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 548-49 (Houghton Mifflin 3d
ed. 1990). More recently, actions of the five major record companies to engage in
RPM for CDs cost consumers as much as $480 million from 1997 to 2000. Press
Release, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm'n, Record Companies Settle FTC Charges of
Restraining Competition in CD Music Market (May 10, 2000) available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/05/cdpres.shtm (last visited Oct. 2, 2007). Many
other antitrust regimes ban RPM. The European Union ("EU") treats minimum
LAWS AND OTHER RELATED STATUTES
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By the time Congress repealed Miller-Tydings, many states
had already repealed their Fair Trade laws, having found the
experiment a failure. 99 In fact, states with Fair Trade laws had a 55
percent higher rate of business failure than states that fully banned
RPM.' 0 0 According to then-FTC chair Lewis Engman, the Fair Trade
laws actually stifled market entry by' new retail businesses seeking to
compete by offering lower prices.

RPM as presumptively unlawful, which is equivalent to American per se illegal.
Commission Regulation 2790/1999, 1999 O.J. (L 336) 21 (EC). EU member
states France, Germany and the United Kingdom treat minimum RPM similarly in
purely domestic manners. 2 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, Chapter6 France,
in COMPETITION LAWS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES Fr. 1, Fr.42 (H. Stephen
Harris, Jr. ed., 2001); 2 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, Chapter 7 Germany, in
COMPETITION LAWS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES F.R.G.1, F.R.G.33 (H. Stephen
Harris, Jr. ed., 2001); 2 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, United Kingdom, in
COMPETITION LAWS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES U.K.1, U.K.56 (H. Stephen
Harris, Jr. ed., 2001). Canada treats RPM as a criminal offense. See, e.g., Price
Fixing: Record Canadian Fine is Levied in Resale Price Maintenance Case, 83
A.T.R.R. 410 (2002). Most Organizations for Economic Co-operation and
Development ("OECD") nations ban RPM. See OECD, Roundtable on Resale
Price Maintenance (1998), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/7/1920261.pdf (last
visited Oct. 2, 2007); See also Press Release, Australian Competition & Consumer
Commission, Topfield Distributor Penalised $238 000 for Resale Price
Maintenance, (Dec. 13, 2006) available at http://www.accc.gov.au/content/
index.phtml/itemld/773132 (last visited Oct. 2, 2007) (noting Australia's treatment
of RPM).
99 Calvani & Berg, supra note 46, at 1177. Some states also found RPM
unconstitutional under their state constitutions. Id. There is some debate about the
number of states that enforced their statutes by 1975. See Rudolph J. Peritz,
Frontiersof Legal Thought : A Counter-HistoryOf Antitrust Law, 1990 DUKE L.J.
263, 298 n. 148 (1990).
'00 S. REP. NO. 94-466, at 3 (1975); "It has been established by a U.S.
Department of Justice study prepared by Dr. Leonard Weiss in 1969 that stores in
fair trade States almost universally have a significantly lower volume of retail sales
than stores in free trade areas .

.

. sales volume per store is systematically lower

under fair trade." 121 CONG. REC. 38,050 (daily ed. Dec. 2, 1975) (statement of
Sen. Brooke). See also Peritz, supra note 99, at 298.
'ol See H.R. REP. NO. 94-341, at 4-5 (1975); see also Peritz, supra note 99, at
298; but see Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2716 (stating "Resale price maintenance ... can
increase... market entry for new firms and brands.").
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2. RPM's Procompetitive Effects are Infrequent and
Speculative
Justice Kennedy wrote "there is now widespread agreement
that resale price maintenance can have procompetitive effects." 10 2 To
support this statement, he cited to an amicus brief from a group of
economists. 10 3 Few-including the amici economists-would dispute
that RPM can theoretically have procompetitive effects; the real issue
is how often it has anticompetitive effects. And to that, the same
amici economists also said "[tihe disagreement in the literature
relates principally to the relative frequency with which
10 4
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects are likely to ensue."
Justice Kennedy, however, did not include this point in the majority's
opinion.
The Court made Leegin the law of the land without any clear
consensus as to how the decision would affect the US economy and
consumers. There has been little empirical research in this area, and
there continues to be spirited debate.105
To better explain his disagreement with the majority, Justice
Breyer, in his dissent, provided examples of how RPM could promote

102

Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2721; See also Easterbrook, supra note 47, at 156.

The Supreme Court has long held that the mere existence of some procompetitive
benefit to a naked price restraint does not justify it. See, e.g., United States v.
Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927); United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224-26 (1940); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 782
(1975). The Court has also held that "cases that do not fit the generalization may
arise, but a per se rule reflects the judgment that such cases are not sufficiently
common or important to justify the time and expense necessary to identify them.
Cont'l TV, Inc., 433 U.S. at 50 n.16.
103 Br. for Economists as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 16, Leegin,
127 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 06-480). Justice Kennedy failed to mention that the
economists limited their sweeping statement to a survey of "the theoretical
literature." Br. for Economists, supra. But "the basic reason the per se rule
continues to be accepted is that those ...who would argue against it [] have not
made their case outside of an economic laboratory." Sanford M. Litvack, The
Future Viability of the CurrentAntitrust Treatment of Vertical Restraints, 75 CAL.
L. REv. 955, 956 (1987). Regardless of economic theory, common sense also
suggests that RPM would lead to higher prices. Howard P. Marvel & Stephen
McCafferty, The PoliticalEconomy of Resale Price Maintenance, 94 J. POL. ECON.
1074, 1075 (1986).
104Br. for Economists, supra note 103, at 50 n.16.

10s See, e.g.,

POSNER,

supra note 47; Easterbrook, supra note 47, at 151;

Ippolito, supra note 47, at 293; Overstreet, supranote 47, at 1.
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inefficiency and anticompetitive effects. With respect to retailers,
Justice Breyer noted that RPM agreements can diminish or eliminate
intrabrand competition, much like horizontal price fixing.' 0 6 RPM
can prevent retailers from cutting prices in response to demand,
Justice Breyer wrote, or prompt dealers to pour money and attention
into service, at the expense of price competition. °7 Lawful RPM
may even discourage efficient sellers that ordinarily would grow by
passing cost savings on to customers in the form of lower prices.1 08
With regard to manufacturers, Justice Breyer noted that RPM
0 9
may encourage collusion by making price cutting easier to observe.1
An efficient manufacturer would only be able to stimulate additional
customer demand by cutting resale prices, as well as wholesale
prices, potentially causing an undesired price war amongst its
horizontal competitors. Thus, such price cutting is unlikely to
happen.' 10 None of this increases consumer welfare.
3. Leegin was Contrary to the Intent of Congress
The Court was well aware that in 1975 Congress passed the
CGPA, which outlawed state Fair Trade laws and restored Dr. Miles'
per se rule against RPM."' The Court even acknowledged this when
it wrote in an earlier decision "Congress recently has expressed its
approval of a per se analysis of vertical price restraints by repealing
Miller-Tydings"1 2 In Leegin, however, the Court inexplicably said
that since the CGPA did not codify per se illegality for RPM, the3
courts were free to articulate governing principles of common law."
This ignores both the legislative history 4 and actions of Congress in
the intervening years.
106

Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2727.

107 Id.

108Id.
109 Id.
110

Id

"' Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2724-25.
112 Cont'l TV., Inc., 433 U.S. at 51 n.18.
113

Id. "[A] rule of reason for RPM would clearly undermine Congress' intent."
448 (3d ed. 2005).
Justice Scalia's hostility to legislative history is well known.

HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY
114

See e.g.

ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW (1998); Zedner v. United States, 401 F.3d 36 (Scalia, J., concurring); "The
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By its own terms, and by the plain meaning of the text of the
law, the CGPA was an "[a]ct to amend the Sherman Antitrust Act to
provide lower prices for consumers."" 5 The bill was so popular that
Congress was "unable to find anyone willing to take a stand" against
repealing Miller-Tydings. 116 On signing the bill, President Ford
wrote:
I am today signing into law [a bill] which will make it
illegal for manufacturers to fix the prices of consumer
products sold by retailers. This new legislation will repeal
laws enacted in 1937 and 1952 which amended the Federal
antitrust laws so States could authorize
otherwise illegal
17
agreements between manufacturer."
Since RPM was per se illegal at the time under Dr. Milessave for the Miller-Tydings exception that allowed states to get
around Dr. Miles-repeal of Miller-Tydings meant Congress restored
Dr. Miles'per se rule and made it effective throughout the country.
In 1983, the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") filed an
amicus brief in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., asking the
Supreme Court to reconsider the entire per se rule for vertical
arrangements." 8 Congress responded by passing appropriations bills
law is what the law says," according to Justice Scalia, "and we should content
ourselves with reading it rather than psychoanalyzing those who enacted it." Bank
One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 279 (1996)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). But to discern the intent of the
Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975 does not require a background in
psychoanalysis. The intent of Congress was obvious in the text of the bill, and in
actions taken by Congress in the years following 1975. See infra note 115.
115 Act of Dec. 12, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801
(1975) (Act
amending Sherman Antitrust Act). See also S. REP. No. 94-466, at 1 (1975)
(stating "The purpose of the proposed legislation is to repeal Federal antitrust
exemptions which permit States to enact fair trade laws [which are] legalized price
fixing ....Without these exemptions the agreements they authorize would violate
the antitrust laws"). There is ample evidence that a return to RPM will raise prices,
thus violating the text of the act. See Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2717-20.
116 Eileen Shanahan, No Defenders of "Fair Trade" are Found at Repeal
Hearing,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1975, at 72.
117 Gerald Ford, Statement on the Consumer Goods Pricing
Act of 1975 (Dec.
12, 1975) available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=5432
(last visited Oct. 2, 2007).
118 Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 761 n.7. In a concurrence, Justice Brennan wrote
that Dr. Miles "has stood for 73 years, and Congress has certainly been aware of its
existence throughout that time. Yet Congress has never enacted legislation to
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23

in 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1987 that specifically prohibited the DOJ
from using any funds to advocate against Dr. Miles.1 1 9 In 1989,
Assistant Attorney General James F. Rill, speaking for the DOJ's
antitrust division, promised
to enforce Dr. Miles and not to advocate
120
overruled.
be
it
that
Justice Kennedy's Leegin opinion not only suggests that the
plain meaning of the CGPA was not enough, that the subsequent acts
of Congress were not enough,
and that the ongoing enforcement
actions of the DOJ and FTC were not enough, 1 2 but that in order to
retain the vitality of23Dr. Miles, Congress would have to vote to
support it every year.'

overrule the interpretation of the Sherman Act adopted in that case. Under these
circumstances, I see no reason for us to depart from our longstanding interpretation
of the Act. Id. at 769 (Brennan, J., concurring); See also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S.
258 (1972) (Supreme Court loathes to overturn cases where Congress, by its
positive inaction, has evinced endorsement).
119 Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Appropriations Act, 1984, § 510, Pub. L. No. 98-166, 97 Stat. 1102-03 (1983);
Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriation Act, 1986, § 605, Pub. L. No. 99-180, 99 Stat. 1169-71 (1985);
Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1987, § 605, Pub. L. No. 99-500, 100
Stat. 1783-73 (1986); Continuing Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1988, § 605, Pub. L.
No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329-38 (1987).
120 James F. Rill, Assistant Attorney Gen., Speech at the 23rd New England
Antitrust Conference (Nov. 9, 1989), in 57 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)

671.
The bipartisan Antitrust Modernization Commission declined to study Dr.
Miles, noting there was "a relatively low level of controversy on the subject."
Memorandum from the Antitrust Modernization Commission on Single-Firm
Conduct
Working
Group
(Dec.
21,
2004),
available
at
http://www.amc.gov/pdf/meetings/Single-FirmConduct.pdf (last visited Oct. 2,,
2007). The Antitrust Modernization Commission also noted "Congressional
support year in, year out for maintenance of the Per se rule." Transcript of January
13, 2005 Meeting, Antitrust Modernization Commission 130 available at
http://www.amc.gov/pdf/meetings/050113_MeetingTranscript reform.pdf
(last
visited Oct. 2, 2007).
122 See, e.g., Br. for AAI as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 27 n.12,
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 06-480) (listing recent FTC and DOJ bringing cases
under Dr. Miles against RPM conduct); Br. for the States as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 4, Leegin, 127 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 06-480) (listing recent
cases brought by states under Dr. Miles against RPM conduct).
123 Or at least amend the Sherman Act yet again-a cumbersome process at
best-to enshrine the per se rule in the United States Code.
121
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That actually may come to pass. Less than one month after
the Leegin decision, the Senate Judiciary subcommittee on Antitrust,
Competition Policy and Consumer Rights began hearings on the
matter. 124

4. Overruling Dr. Miles Greatly Increases Business Costs
Regardless of its imperfections, Dr. Miles created a brightline per se rule that lasted ninety six years. With Leegin, the Court
did not make RPM per se lawful-it instead opened this area of law
to the rule of reason. This not only creates uncertainty for businesses
that scrupulously have followed the same procedures for decades, it
likely also
will subject firms to more litigation and greater
125
expenses.
Rule of reason cases require proof that a defendant possessed
market power, and that its exercise of market power led to an
unreasonable outcome, such as an increase in prices or a decrease in
output. The plaintiff then must rebut the defendant's justifications
for its conduct. Such
cases can take years to litigate and "are
126
extremely expensive."

124

Supreme Court Decision On Retail Price Setting: Hearing Before the S.

Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy And Consumer Rights, 110th Cong.
(2007).
125 "Once established, per se rules tend to provide guidance to the business
community and to minimize the burdens on litigants and the judicial system of the
more complex rule-of-reason trials." Cont'l T V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 50, n.16. "The
Court's invitation to consider the existence of 'market power,' for example, invites
lengthy time-consuming argument among competing experts, as they seek to apply
abstract, highly technical, criteria to often ill-defined markets. And resale price
maintenance cases, unlike a major merger or monopoly case, are likely to prove
numerous and involve only private parties. One cannot fairly expect judges and
juries in such cases to apply complex economic criteria without making a
considerable number of mistakes, which themselves may impose serious costs."
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2730 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). But
see Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2718 (stating "[a]ny possible reduction in administrative
costs cannot alone justify the Dr.Miles rule.").
126 Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Casefor a Per
Se Rule against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1489 (1983). Also, "it is
very difficult for a plaintiff (either the government or a private party) to win a rule
of reason case." Id. Most alleged antitrust violations are analyzed under the Rule
of Reason, save price fixing, horizontal territorial or customer divisions, group
boycotts and some tying arrangements.
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL
ANTITRUST POLICY 255 (Thompson/West 3d ed. 2005).
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Additionally, lower courts will now be forced to puzzle out
how the rule of reason applies to RPM, without any clear guidance
from the Court.'
Some businesses will be more likely to engage in
RPM because of Leegin, while others will be less likely to do so
because of the uncertainty it created. What this means, however, is
that more fees are paid to attorneys for counseling and litigation. The
Court has long recognized that per se rules can be a more efficient
means of deterring unlawful conduct.' 28 By wiping away this longheld and very useful per se rule, the Court likely has squandered the
significant deterrent effect of Dr.Miles.
One possible result of Leegin is balkanization of the antitrust
laws. Some pro-consumer states may now codify a per se rule
against RPM, creating an untenable and expensive situation where
manufacturers must apply different rules to retailers in different
states. 129 Whether litigated in federal courts under a rule of reason,
or in state courts under what likely is to be a patchwork of different
standards, the Leegin decision is likely to raise costs for businesses
and, ultimately, consumers.
5. The Red Herring of Free Riding
Leegin argued that without RPM, "free-rider problems may
diminish retailers' incentives to provide services."' 30 The Court
agreed, stating "[a]bsent vertical price restraints, the retail services
that enhance interbrand competition might be underprovided. This is
because discounting retailers can free ride on retailers who furnish
127 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2730 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("How easily can courts
identify instances in which the benefits are likely to outweigh potential harms? My
own answer is, not very easily.") (emphasis in original).
128 See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (stating per se
rules are "more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned ... [and] also avoids
the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation.
.
v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 322, 344 (1982) (stating
. ."); Arizona
per se rules benefit business certainty and litigation efficiency).

129 Or at least states that consider an increase in prices to be "anti-consumer."
Antitrust suits may be brought under federal law or under the antitrust laws of
many states.

LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF

ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 946 (Thomson/West 2d ed.,2006).While
many state antitrust laws require interpretations to be consistent with federal case
law where practicable, states would likely not be preempted from legislative or
judicial endorsement of a per se rule against RPM. See, e.g., Mass. Gen Laws ch.
93 § 1 (2007).
130 Brief for Petitioner at 19-20, Leegin, 127 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 06-480).
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services and then capture some of the increased demand those
services generate."' 13 1 Justice Breyer responded in dissent:
There is a consensus in the literature that 'free riding' takes
place. But 'free riding' often takes place in the economy
without any legal effort to stop it. Many visitors to
California take free rides on the Pacific Coast Highway.
We all benefit freely from ideas, such as that of creating the
first supermarket. Dealers often take a 'free ride' on
investments that others have made in building a product's
name and reputation. The question is how often the 'free
riding' problem is serious enough significantly to deter
dealer investment.' 32
Free riding may indeed be a problem, but neither the majority,
the petitioner, nor the economic literature suggest that it is
widespread or common. 133 Indeed, Dr. Miles only prohibited
agreements to fix prices. Colgate, however, permitted a
manufacturer, determined to stem free riding, to announce a
suggested retail
price and then terminate any reseller engaged in
34
discounting. 1

Even lawful RPM may fail to deter a dedicated free rider.
Two economists who joined an amicus brief asking that Dr. Miles be
35
overruled wrote that free rider theory is "fundamentally flawed."',
"No matter how large a margin is created by resale price
maintenance, there appears to be no incentive for competitive free-

131 Leegin,
132

127 S. Ct. at 2715.

Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2729.

133See Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2730 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("All this is to say

that the ultimate question is not whether, but how much, 'free riding' of this sort
takes place. And, after reading the briefs, I must answer that question with an
uncertain 'sometimes.') (emphasis in original). See also Brief for William S.
Comanor & Frederic M. Scherer as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 6-7,
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. 2705 (No 06-480) (expressing skepticism about how often it
occurs); FREDERIC M. SCHERER & DAVID R. Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 551-555 (Houghton Mifflin 1990)
(1980). (noting "severe limitations" of the free-rider justification for PRM); Robert
Pitofsky, Why Dr. Miles Was Right, 8 REGULATION 27, 29-30 (1984).
114 Colgate &

Co., 250 U.S. at 307.

Benjamin Klein & Kevin Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract
Enforcement Mechanisms, 31 J. LAW & ECON. 265, 266 (1988).
135
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riding retailers to supply the desired services."' 136 In sum, if retailers
are given any chance to discount prices, some always will do so.
Those discounters may still free ride off retailers providing greater
service, regardless of the profit they might earn by sticking to the
suggested retail price.
Overruling Dr. Miles will not stop free riding, even if free
riding is a common problem. And forcing retailers to compete on
service and forbidding them from competing on price places undue
and inefficient emphasis on just one component of retailing. 137
In the Court's previous ventures into the per se rule in vertical
relationships, there were more reasons to be concerned with free
riders. In one case, a company sold dangerous pesticides and sought
to promote full service dealers who might properly train customers to
use them.138 In another case, a failing electronics company wanted to
find retailers who would feature the company's products over the

competition. 139
The Leegin majority suggests that RPM will result in retail
stores plowing extra money into service so that supermarkets or drug
stores will employ helpful sales personnel to explain and compare
products. However, this approach may not happen universally. In
reality, RPM will likely increase the prices of every day purchases at
those same supermarkets or drug stores and only theoretically
improve service and ambience for infrequently purchased
big ticket
40
1
assistance.
sales
and
service
greater
for
call
items that

IV. Conclusion
The eventual outcome of the Court's experiment with the US
economy defies easy predictions. Major discount stores refused to
carry RPM-mandated goods during the Miller-Tydings era and are

136

Id.

137 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2727 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Further, suggesting that

a multibrand outlet, such as a drugstore or a supermarket, will provide better
service because certain products cannot be discounted makes little sense. Robert
Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Casefor a Per Se Rule against
VerticalPrice Fixing, 71 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1493 (1983).
138 Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 756.
139 Cont'l T. V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 38.
140 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2710-25. No where does the majority opinion discuss
the decision's potential impact on internet sellers and that entire segment of the

American economy.
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unlikely to do so now. Wal-Mart and similar stores will likely carry
more secondary brands, more private-label goods, and rely more
heavily on imports. 14 1 Consumers will be forced to buy lesser known
products, pay higher prices, or both.
All of these decisions
significantly will affect the American economy, consumers, and
consumer welfare.
The Leegin decision is another step in the Court's continuing
effort to evaluate vertical restrictions and limit per se treatment. The
journey began with the Court's decision in 1977 to overrule a decade
old rule that imposed the per se standard on vertical non-price
restrictions. 14 2 The Court sought to end confusion as to the
boundaries for lawful conduct in non-price restrictions. 14' Dr. Miles'
simple holding, however, was not the source of equal confusion.
The journey continued in 1997 when the Court overruled a
three decades-old rule that imposed the per se standard on maximum
RPM. 144 That rule was neither enforced nor did it retain significant
vitality. 145 Dr. Miles, however, was rigorously
enforced by the
14
federal government and individual states. ,

141 Charles E. Mueller, et al., Foreword. Antitrust and the Discounters' Case
Against Resale Price Maintenace, 14 ANTITRUST L & ECON. REv. 1, 6 No.3 (1982);
S. Robson Walton, Antitrust, RPM, and the Big Brands: Discounting in SmallTown America, 14 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REv. 81, 85-86 No.3 (1982).
142 Cont'l T. V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 59.

Cont'l T. V. Inc., 433 U.S. at 47-48. Schwinn was overruled because it
created confusion as to which non-price restraints were lawful and which were not.
See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
141

State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 22.
Id. at 18. One reason Albrecht was overruled was that it had "little or no
relevance to ongoing enforcement of the Sherman Act." See Albrecht v. Herald
Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
146 See, e.g., New York v. Salton, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 2d 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litig., 216 F.R.D. 197 (D.
Me. 2003); In re Nine West Shoes Antitrust Litig., 80 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y.
2000); Texas v. Zeneca, Inc., 1997-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) P 71,888 (N.D. Tex. 1997);
Missouri v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 1997-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,712 (W.D. Mo.
1997); New York v. Reebok Int'l, Ltd., 903 F. Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), affd, 96
F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 1996); Pennsylvania v. Playmobil USA, 1995-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
P 71,215 (M.D. Pa. 1995); New York v. Keds Corp., 1994-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) P
70,549 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Maryland v. Mitsubishi Elecs. Am., 1992-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 69,743 (D. Md. 1992); New York v. Nintendo of Am., 775 F. Supp. 676
(S.D.N.Y. 1991); In re Minolta Camera Prods. Antitrust Litig., 668 F. Supp. 456
(D. Md. 1987).
'44

145
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Although Leegin eliminated the last per se rule in vertical
relationships, it is safe to imagine that the ride is not over yet. First,
the Court subjected RPM to the rule of reason and did not suggest
that RPM was per se lawful. Undoubtedly, a great deal of future
litigation will arise to determine precisely what that means. Second,
the early reactions of Congress r4 7 and many states 148 suggest that
even if Dr. Miles is gone, it may soon be codified at the federal or
state level.
There were many other problems with Leegin, not the least of
which was its dismissal of the value of stare decisis for Dr. Miles.
Such a topic is beyond the scope of this essay. Undoubtedly,
however, many scholars and practitioners will closely analyze the
Court's test for stare decisis in Leegin, 149 including Justice Breyer's
challenge to Justice Scalia to explain how50overruling Dr. Miles fits
within standards articulated in other cases.
At best, Leegin was an imperfect candidate to overrule a
ninety-six-year-old precedent. Leegin itself is not a purely vertical
distributor; it operates seventy of its own retail stores that compete
directly with approximately five thousand retailers, including Kay's
Kloset.15 1 Leegin even misrepresented that its business model was to
sell products through small boutiques focused on service when in
52 fact
Leegin also sells its products at Nordstrom and on the Internet.1
Leegin had some difficulty explaining how its RPM would
benefit consumers. It suggested that RPM would allow it to develop
more particularized sales expertise, more effective signaling of

147

See HearingBefore the Senate Subcomm., supra note 124.

148

See Brief for Thirty Seven States, supra note 94.

149

Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2721-23.

Id. at 2734. (Breyer, J., dissenting). See also Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis.
Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2684-87 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
' Br. of Petitioner in Opposition to Certiorari at 4, Leegin, 127 S. Ct. 2705.
Indeed, had others litigated the case, Leegin might have been accused of horizontal
price fixing between its retail stores and the independent distributors. Horizontal
price fixing is (still) per se illegal.
152 This was noted in a footnote in Leegin's expert's report, which was then
excluded at trial. Br. of Petitioner for Certiorari, Appendix D at 50 n.44, Leegin,
127 S. Ct. 2705; see also Brighton, Press Release, Feb. 10, 2005, available at
http://www.brighton.com/retail/privacy/pressreleasel.htm (last visited Oct. 2,
150
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product quality, and a more ideal shopping experience. 53 FTC
Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour, disagreeing with the FTC's
endorsement of an amicus brief supporting overruling Dr. Miles,
wrote in a letter to the Court:
... ladies handbags are not technological wonders
requiring extensive operational expertise and consumer
education. Ladies handbags do not require acoustically
optimized demonstration rooms. Ladies handbags do not
require extensive post-sales servicing, or inventories of
repair and replacement parts. Ladies handbags do not
require special climate-controlled storage to prevent health
risks. The only real "service" at issue appears to be
steering the customer to purchase Leegin's products, to the
benefit of the manufacturer and the agreeing
retailers. The
54
benefit to consumers is not self-evident.1
All but forgotten today, the Dr. Miles Medical Co. existed as
an independent company until the 1970s and did, to quote
Commissioner Harbour, create "technological wonders.'' 35 Although
requirements to list ingredients under the Pure Food & Drug Act put
an end to the patent medicine era and most snake oil remedies, Dr.
Miles found success by concentrating on Nervine and investing
heavily in advertising. Its generous advertising budget included
almanacs sent to rural customers, calendars distributed by druggists,
and a series of books on health and housekeeping topics.
153

Br. for Petitioner at 3-4, 20-21, 22-24, Leegin, 127 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 06-480)

(Jan. 22, 2007).
154 Harbour Letter, supra note 63, at 17 (internal citations
omitted). Indeed,
even at discount electronics stores, at least one owner believes that customers will
not return to a store unless the sales staff is sufficiently trained to explain the
products being marketed. Mattioli, supra note 82, at 31-32. See also Michael
Fitzgerald, Antitrust, Discounting, and RPM in the Sporting-Goods Industry: A
'Chicago' Reply to Professor Baxter, 14 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REv. 43, 69-71
No.3 (1982).
155Harbour Letter, supra note 63, at 17.
Indiana Historical Society, supra note 15. By 1893, Miles spent one
hundred thousand dollars on advertising. Id.Between 1902 and 1942 the company
issued more than one billion publications. Funding Universe, Miles Laboratories
Company History, http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/MILESLABORATORIES-Company-History.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2007). A book
distributed to maintain weather records noted that "Dr. Miles' Heart Cure does not
contain any opium, morphine, cocaine, chloral, ether or chloroform in any form."
156
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During the 1920s, Dr. Miles researched the possibility of
turning Nervine into a modem tablet.15 7 That led to experimentation
with effervescence. 58 After observing that reporters at a local
Indiana newspaper seemed to resist colds by drinking a mixture of
aspirin and bicarbonate of soda, Dr. Miles invented Alka-Seltzer in
193 1.'6 In 1977, Bayer AG purchased Dr. Miles Co. for $253
million. 16
Despite its setback in the Supreme Court in 1911, the Dr.
Miles Medical Co. had a long and vital history. And, despite the most
recent setback this year to the RPM doctrine, it is likely that we have
not heard the last of Dr. Miles or its per se rule against RPM.

Gary England, Oklahoma's Meteorologist,DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Mar. 6, 2002.
157 Centaur Communications Ltd., A Brand with A Sparkling Past, Brand
Heritage 32 (January 27, 1995).
158 id.
'59

Funding Universe, supra note 156. In 1974, the FDA called Alka-Selzer an

"irrational" mixture of aspirin (a stomach irritant) and bicarbonate of soda (an
antacid), and Ralph Nader-related consumer groups questioned its ability to settle

upset stomachs. Id. Dr. Miles also created Flintstone vitamins and Bactine
antiseptic spray. Id.
160

Id.

